

## **The Abraham Accords: A New Political Approach to Palestine**

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### **Abstract**


*The 2020 Abraham Accords fundamentally reshaped Middle Eastern geopolitics by establishing formal diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab states—namely the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan thereby dismantling the decades-old Arab consensus that had made normalization contingent upon a comprehensive resolution of the Palestinian issue. This historic breakthrough represented more than mere diplomatic recognition; it signaled a profound strategic realignment wherein individual state interests, particularly regarding security and economic development, began to supersede longstanding ideological commitments to pan-Arab solidarity and the Palestinian cause. This analysis aims to critically examine the complex strategic motivations underlying the Abraham Accords and to assess their transformative impact on the regional order, particularly regarding how they have reconfigured traditional alliance structures and conflict dynamics across the Middle East. The primary objective is to identify and analyze the convergence of "push and pull" factors driving this realignment with specific focus on the perceived Iranian threat as the principal push factor, alongside the attractive forces of technological cooperation, security partnerships, and economic diversification as key pull factors while also evaluating the long-term sustainability of this new geopolitical configuration. The study employs an integrated multi-theoretical framework combining realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Accords, examining respectively the security calculations against Iran, the economic incentives driving cooperation, and the emerging shift toward a pragmatic regional identity that transcends traditional ideological commitments. The research reveals that while the Accords have successfully transformed the broad Arab-Israeli conflict into a more localized Palestinian-Israeli struggle, this new status quo remains inherently fragile. The unresolved Palestinian question continues to generate popular unrest and provides strategic leverage for non-state actors, while the signatories' simultaneous hedging strategies through engagement with China and Russia, combined with the architecture's heavy dependence on U.S. mediation susceptible to domestic political volatility, collectively undermine the long-term stability of this realignment. Thus, the Accords represent not the conclusion of regional conflict but*

rather the beginning of a more complex and uncertain chapter in Middle Eastern international relations.

**Keywords:** Israel, Palestine, Iran, Gulf, Pakistan, United States, Turkey

### Introductions

As seen in the image below, the UN's 1947 Partition Plan advocated for the establishment of an Israeli State and an Arab State inside Palestine. In accordance with the Balfour Declaration, this Partition Plan provided territory to Jews worldwide so they might coexist peacefully following the Holocaust atrocities of World War II. According to this Partition Plan, Israel received 78% of ancient Palestine and the Palestinians received 22% (the West Bank and Gaza Strip). (Beinin, 2014) This Partition Plan was approved by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947. The vote was 33 in favor, 13 against, and 10 abstentions. The Palestinians refer to this as the "Nakba" or "Catastrophe." This partition resolution has angered both the Arab States and the Palestinians, and none of them supported it. Although there had been conflicts between Israel, Palestine, and the Arab States under the British administration of Palestine, this resolution serves as one of the pivotal points in the conflict. (Beinin, 2014)



*UN partition Plan for Palestine Author U.S. Central Intelligence Agency*

Israel won the 1948, 1967, and 1973 Israel-Arab wars as a result of this battle, and it also claimed further Palestinian territory. In actuality, these conflicts resulted in the annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights, the occupation of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, and the occupation of what was left of historic Palestine. Since 1973, there have been no significant conflicts between Israel and the

Arab states. Nonetheless, there are still many conflicts today, particularly between Israel and the Palestinians, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon (Gelvin, 2014). By the end of 2020, a number of important developments in the long-running Arab-Israeli conflict had taken place.

In September 2020, the United Arab Emirates and the state of Israel (UAE) signed the Abraham Accords, also known as the Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations, and Full Normalisation, in the White House. Through cooperation in a variety of civilian sectors, including as health, agriculture, tourism, energy, the environment, and innovation, they particularly aimed to advance development and prosperity. Bahrain soon stated that it would sign the Abraham Accords, also known as the Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations. In October and December of 2020, respectively, similar normalisation agreements were announced with Sudan and Morocco. According to reports in the media, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries may follow suit. (Molendyke, February 2021)

None of the current or prospective Arab governments joining the accords have a border with Israel or have fought Israel in any of the seven Arab-Israeli wars that occurred between 1948 and 2006, with the exception of Morocco, which briefly participated in the October 1973 conflict. Additionally, prior to the treaties, Israel's political relationships with these countries differed. The Abraham Accords have ramifications for the almost century-long Palestinian-Israeli conflict as well as US security in the Middle East, particularly US military sales and Iran's ambitions for regional hegemony. Relationships varied from open animosity (as in Sudan) to no relationship (as in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates) to brief diplomatic ties at the level of liaison offices (as in Morocco, 1995–2000). The impact of the accords on US security in the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. (Molendyke, February 2021)

A series of agreements known as the Abraham Accords achieved diplomatic normalisation between Israel and numerous Arab nations, starting with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The United States, led by President Donald Trump, mediated the agreements, which were announced in August and September 2020 and signed in Washington, D.C. on September 15, 2020. The first Arab nations to publicly recognise Israel since Jordan in 1994 were the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. In the months that followed, Sudan and Morocco also decided to restore diplomatic ties with Israel; although, as of 2024, Sudan's accord has not been confirmed. According to reports in July 2025, the second Trump administration was attempting to add Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon to the accords. (Guzansky, 2020)

With the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979) and the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty (1994), Arab nations and Israel started to normalise their relations. The Arab Peace Initiative (API) was also approved by the Arab League in March 2002. The API supports normalising ties with Israel in return for the evacuation of Palestine's seized territory. (Trigano, 2021)

The end of the Soviet era and the conflict between the free and communist worlds are linked to the Abraham Accords. Under the guise of "anticolonialism," the Soviets used the Arab world as one of the most significant levers in their anti-Western campaign. The Arab nations that emerged from decolonisation formed into a single bloc under the USSR's leadership, bound together by their animosity towards Zionism and Israel. (Trigano, 2021)


Identification with the Palestinian cause, which was framed as a "national cause" in the fight against colonialism rather than as the holy war it actually was, was crucial to this arrangement. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established during a KGB-sponsored congress in Romania in 1964, according to Gen. Ian Pacépa, the former head of Romania's External Intelligence Service under Ceausescu before defecting to the West. In order to appeal to the European Left of the free world, which at the time was enamored with Third-Worldism and anti-colonialism, the congress made a crucial strategic choice: to reframe the Palestinian cause as a "national" cause. (Trigano, 2021)

### **The Palestinian Cause: Moving Toward a More Localized Struggle**

One of the most critical consequences of the *Abraham Accords* is the transformation of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict into a more localized Palestinian-Israeli struggle. As the normalization of relations between Israel and the Gulf states continues, the collective leverage that Arab states once held over Israel concerning the Palestinian issue has diminished. This shift reflects a broader trend where the Palestinian cause, while still rhetorically supported, has become increasingly sidelined in favor of national interests, particularly concerning Iran, economic development, and technological cooperation. While Gulf states, such as the UAE and Bahrain, continue to express their support for Palestinian aspirations, their formal recognition of Israel demonstrates a pragmatic departure from past diplomatic strategies. Instead of framing normalization as contingent upon Palestinian statehood, these countries are pursuing a new strategy that prioritizes security partnerships, economic growth, and regional cooperation over pan-Arab solidarity with Palestine. (Laila Rizky Amaliya, 2025)

### **The Landscape of the Issue**

The Abraham Accords, which were signed by the White House on September 15, 2020, were normalisation accords mediated by the United States that took place between August and September of 2020. Israel first agreed to establish connections with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, then with Sudan and Morocco. The accords marked a geopolitical shift in the Middle East, as security and economic concerns began to take precedence over the previous requirement that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be resolved before normalisation could take place.



*the Abraham Accords Tuesday, Sept. 15, 2020, on the South Lawn of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)*

The geopolitical significance of this can be summed up as follows: normalization decreased Israel's diplomatic isolation in some Arab countries, created new avenues for intelligence and security cooperation, and encouraged Israeli outreach to regional actors and minorities, which has the potential to alter regional power dynamics.



*President Donald J. Trump, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the United Arab Emirates Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan signs the Abraham Accords Tuesday, Sept. 15, 2020, on the South Lawn of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)*

### **The Abraham Accord: A Possible Watershed Moment.**

With the intention of creating peace and stability in the region and formalising the two nations' diplomatic relations, the United States negotiated a historic reunion between Israel and the United Arab Emirates through an agreement known as the Abraham Accord. More Arab nations are probably going to sign the Abraham Accord, which is frequently referred to as a "historic step" towards peace, according to Myrvold (2022). In actuality, it represents a slow shift towards strategic collaboration and forming an alliance against common regional enemies. Three perspectives exist about the importance of the Accord: on a domestic level for Israel and the UAE, on a regional level with an emphasis on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine, and on an international level as a potential game-changer for the UAE, Israel, and the United States. (Ilyas, 2023)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed contracts with Bahrain's Foreign Minister Abdullatif Al Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan at the US-sponsored event. Since Israel signed peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, these agreements make them the third and fourth Arab nations to take such actions to normalise relations.

At the White House event, Trump declared, "The people of the Middle East will no longer allow hatred of Israel to be fomented as an excuse for radicalism or extremism." Additionally, they will no longer permit their region's magnificent destiny to be denied. (Jazeera, 15 Sep 2020)

Despite being a diplomatic victory for Netanyahu, the event occurs while he is being criticised domestically for how he handled the coronavirus outbreak and is on trial for corruption on allegations of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust, which have sparked frequent protests in the streets. Denying any crime, Netanyahu characterises his prosecution as a left-wing political witch hunt intended to remove a well-liked right-wing leader. (Jazeera, 15 Sep 2020)

Iran's growing regional influence has alarmed Arabs, non-Arabs, and Jews in especially since the Arab Spring. Hezbollah's ongoing existence under Syrian control, the pro-Iranian governments in Lebanon and Iraq, and the growth of Iranian-backed Houthi forces in Yemen are examples of Iran's growing influence in the Middle East. (Ilyas, 2023)

The Abraham Accord, which ended decades of animosity and ushered in a new era of collaboration, is regarded as a "historic breakthrough" since it formalised long-standing backchannel contacts between the UAE and Israel (Dachtler, 2022; Wachsberger, 2021; Myrvold, 2022). One important result is economic: free trade and investment are anticipated to help both nations' open, technologically advanced markets. 15,000 jobs were expected to be created by \$4 billion in bilateral commerce by 2021.

Both parties sought collaboration in the areas of energy, healthcare, finance, tourism, trade, aviation, and defence, and the Abraham Accord was seen as mutually advantageous (Telci, 2020). As the UAE continues to transition from an oil-based economy to a knowledge economy, Israel now has access to UAE oil and investment in its high-tech industry (Canal Forgues Alter & Janardhan, 2021). In addition to a \$3 billion joint "Abraham Fund" with the US to promote regional economic cooperation, bilateral private investment is anticipated to exceed \$10 billion. (Ilyas, 2023)

### **The Abraham Accords as a Conduit for Corridor Strategies in the Middle East.**

1. Normalisation made it safer for Israel to pursue common priorities, primarily restraining Iran and aggressive non-state actors, and to strengthen intelligence and security connections with Gulf partners. This reduces the political cost for Israel to support nonstate or minority actors or act outside of its immediate boundaries without incurring the same kind of regional backlash.
2. In terms of the economy, the agreements gave Israel more access to Gulf logistics and investment, which it may use to finance humanitarian endeavours, political influence, and soft power outreach to disadvantaged populations in surrounding states. When trying to establish local networks on the ground, these routes are important.
3. In terms of politics, the accords gave some minority groups hope that they could find supporters other than Damascus or Ankara and that interacting with Israel or Gulf states would no longer be frowned upon. This modifies the nature of local negotiations, particularly in divided nations like Syria.

### **The “David Corridor” claim, what it proposes, and what evidence exists**

An alleged Israeli plan to establish a continuous influence or control axis across southern and eastern Syria, connecting the Golan Heights to Kurdish-held areas in the northeast and fostering relations with the Druze and Kurdish communities along the way, has been referred to as the "David Corridor" in a number of recent analyses and commentary. Critics claim it amounts to territorial fragmentation or de facto separation, while supporters portray it as a security buffer and a lifeline to Kurdish partners. (Ilyas, 2023)

### **Islamic Bloc Under Pressure**

NEW YORK: According to an Israeli media report cited by Aljazeera and other media outlets, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS, has informed leaders of Jewish organisations in the US that the Palestinian leadership must accept the terms for peace proposed by US President Donald Trump's administration. (Desk, 2018)

Erdoğan welcomed two Hamas officials, Ismail Haniyeh and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, to Istanbul on August 22, a few days after the Israel-UAE deal, at the Vendetti Mansion. Erdoğan was accompanied by Fahrettin Altun, İbrahim Kalın, the presidential spokeswoman, and Hakan Fidan, the head of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MİT). <sup>7</sup> The United States denounced this action, designating al-Arouri as a terrorist and offering a \$5 million premium for his capture. Turkey condemned the US statement and reminded Washington of the US's open backing for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or PKK) and its continued sheltering of Fethullah Gülen in spite of Ankara's repeated requests for his extradition. (Egeresi, October 2020 )

Israel and the United Arab Emirates announced on Thursday that they will establish a broad new relationship and normalise diplomatic ties, a move that will shift the focus of Middle East affairs from the conflict with Iran to the Palestinian question. Israel agreed to halt its planned annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank as part of the agreement, which U.S. President Donald Trump assisted in mediating. Additionally, it strengthens hostility to Iran, a regional force that the United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates consider to be the primary threat in the Middle East's conflict-ridden region. (aha El Dahan, August 13, 2020)

### **The False Promise of Normalization: Assessing the Strategic Costs for Gulf States**

President Donald Trump's audacious and unwavering support for Israel, along with his obvious desire to form a broad coalition to combat Iran, have made it difficult for Gulf states to be reluctant to embrace a certain degree of ties with Israel. When Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi placed a blockade on Qatar in June 2017, severely reducing that space and shattering the GCC's unity. When Riyadh forged a diplomatic alliance with Washington and Tel Aviv this year to defend its troubled Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in the wake of the Khashoggi incident, it increased pressure on other Gulf states to restore their relations with Israel. (Barakat, Nov 2018). It is clear that the Palestinians must suffer in order for Gulf-Israeli ties to improve. The Saudi-brokered Arab Peace Initiative, a ten-sentence proposal approved by the Arab League in 2002 that called for the normalisation of relations between the Arab world and Israel in exchange for Israel's complete withdrawal from the occupied territories (including East Jerusalem) and a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee issue, is the goal of Israel's normalisation drive. Israel has already had considerable success with this tactic. It persuaded Riyadh to endorse a peace agreement that would

entirely avoid the problem of occupied Palestinian territory, which up until recently constituted the primary obstacle to Arab-Israeli normalisation. In April, MBS, the actual ruler of Saudi Arabia, said that the Palestinians either "accept Trump's proposals or shut up." (Barakat, Nov 2018)

The Gulf-Israeli normalisation efforts are being driven by Oman, a Gulf nation that takes pride in its capacity to defy the Saudi tide when necessary. Oman is unlikely to have yielded to Israeli and American pressure for unconditional normalisation. When the Sultanate agreed to welcome Netanyahu in Muscat, it likely wanted to accomplish more than simply normalise relations with Tel Aviv. The Sultanate is renowned for its willingness to provide a forum for constructive mediation in regional problems. Oman's decision to formally welcome Netanyahu was not meant to be at the expense of the Palestinians, as evidenced by the fact that just one day after Netanyahu's visit, Yusuf bin Alawi, the country's foreign minister, flew to Ramallah to meet with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. (Barakat, Nov 2018). Before moving any closer to normalisation with Israel, Oman and other Gulf governments should consider the following lessons: First, Arab leaders need to understand that Israeli visits are not about promoting peace but rather about garnering broader acceptance of Israel's statehood. Israel has maintained the occupation while gradually fostering international relations since the Madrid Conference.

Secondly, Rabin is not Netanyahu. By attacking Gaza and expanding settlements, he undermines Arab goodwill and demonstrates that any interaction takes place solely on Israel's terms. Unconditional visits simply serve to further marginalise the Palestinians and bolster Israel's right wing.

Third, as a nationalist leader, Netanyahu is aware that public opinion around the world is shifting against Israel due to social media and movements like BDS. He may counteract this trend and gain support from the elite by normalising relations with Arab governments. In order to garner international attention and take advantage of leaks or media campaigns, he will present relations with Gulf states as a conflict over public opinion. (Barakat, Nov 2018)

### **Abraham Accords: A Journey from Arab-Israeli to Palestinian-Israeli Conflict**

First, the choice of a Gulf state to normalise relations with Israel is a clear indication of how much the country and Arab interests have changed, as well as a severe blow to the Palestinian situation. (MILLER, 2020). Second, it appears that a number of Arab nations are willing to distance themselves from the Palestinian cause. The announcement of agreements made it abundantly evident that the Arab world will no longer permit their interests to be negatively impacted, even though they should and will not completely abandon this cause. (MILLER, 2020). Third, the negotiation of a diplomatic settlement would be doomed if the Arab world were unwilling to remove Israel's occupation as a prerequisite for Middle East stability. Fourth, the Palestinians' leverage under the united Arab front will not be replaced by Europe or other international mechanisms. (Rehman, 2020). When Egypt recognised Israel in 1979 in return for Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai, Israel signed its first peace treaty with an Arab nation. (Glass, 2019). This was regarded as the first instance of Arab unity breaking down. The Oslo Accords were reached in the early 1990s as a result of the First Intifada, which broke out in 1987 in opposition to Israel's control of Gaza and the West Bank. These included talks on Palestinian self-government and mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO (Shlaim, 1994). In order to mend relations with Washington during the Gulf War, Jordan became the second Arab nation to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994 (Little, 1995). However, Jordanian public opinion continued to be overwhelmingly

pro-Palestinian. Clinton invited Arafat and Barak to Camp David in 2000, but negotiations broke down. The Second Intifada began shortly after Ariel Sharon's controversial visit to the al-Aqsa mosque. Dozens of people were killed and over a thousand were injured when Israeli troops used deadly force against protesters (Pressman, 2003). Palestinians became dissatisfied with the Oslo Accords' promised socioeconomic advancement and came to believe that international forces had no intention of keeping their word. (Baqai, 2021)

### **Role of Pakistan.**

Similar to Israel, Pakistan is an ideological state that regards itself as an advocate for Muslims. Its mixed political culture and popular opinion, which is based on solidarity with Palestinians and Arab countries, prohibit Israel's recognition. Strong street-level opposition to Israel is demonstrated at protests in Pakistan every year. Citing Jinnah's belief that recognition won't occur until Palestinians receive their rights and a just settlement is accomplished, Imran Khan reiterated Pakistan's long-held stance. (PM Khan, 2020). Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised that Pakistan's strategy is contingent upon the maintenance of regional security and Palestinian ambitions. (MoFA, 2020). Often liberal and pro-Western, pro-recognition forces in Pakistan contend that connections with Israel might strengthen relationships with the US and Europe. Opponents wonder why Pakistan should reject recognition at a time when relations between Arab nations are improving. Nonetheless, Pakistan continues to take a moral stand against human rights abuses, supporting Palestine, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. (Baqai, 2021). Pakistan, which has a variety of beneficial relationships with all of the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) member states, is currently in a difficult situation because of its long-standing stance on the Palestine issue, which shapes how it sees Israel. In light of the conundrum, this article focusses on how Pakistan's relations with the GCC states and its own Israel policy have been affected by the Abraham Peace Accords. It is stated that Pakistan has more to lose than gain by altering its historical stance and acknowledging the state of Israel based on an analysis of numerous ideological and geopolitical issues. (Zahid Shahab Ahmed, November 2021)

### **Turkey – The Change of Heart**

Turkey was the first Muslim nation to recognise Israel. In 1948, it also started working militarily with Israel. But within the past 20 years or more, there has been a significant paradigm shift, and their relationship has become more antagonistic. Relations nearly broke down as a result of Erdogan's criticism of Israel during the 2009 Davos summit and the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident. Israel accuses Turkey of providing refuge to Israeli adversaries, including Hamas members. (Baqai, 2021) In Ankara, the Abraham Accords drew harsh criticism. On August 14, 2020, President Erdogan expressed his support for the Palestinians and criticised the agreement's original declaration. Turkey is a major supporter of the Accord, which governs the western portion of Libya. Turkey's sponsorship and endorsement of the Fatah-Hamas deal may increase its clout with the Palestinian Authority and force it firmly into the anti-Israeli camp. (Baqai, 2021)

### **Theoretical Frame work**

Realism, liberalism, constructivism, and the push-pull paradigm can all be used to understand the Abraham Accords. Realism demonstrates how Israel's security and intelligence advantages drew Gulf governments while Iran's increasing danger pushed them. Liberalism emphasises how Israel's

technology, commerce, and investment prospects drew them in while the constraints of oil-based economies pushed them. Constructivism explains how they were drawn to a new identity based on modernity and pragmatism and driven by the impasse over Palestine. To put it briefly, the agreements came about as a result of push and pull factors that coincided with more significant changes in the economy, power, and regional identity. (Norlen, oct 2020). Liberalism moves our attention to the global system. This theory aids in our analysis of the functions of organisations such as the United Nations and the rules of international law. However, liberalism mainly draws attention to a structural shortcoming in this clash. It highlights a basic disconnect between international conventions and the realities of power politics by demonstrating how diplomatic efforts and humanitarian relief, although vital, have failed to stop the strategic use of displacement. (Baqai, 2021). The important dimension of ideas and identity is added by constructivism. It clarifies that the war is about deeply held, opposing narratives rather than just land or security. The memory of the Nakba (the 1948 tragedy) has a deep impact on Palestinian identity, making displacement a fundamental historical trauma and the "right of return" an unavoidable demand. Israel is associate security and a country with their sense of national identity. Constructivism demonstrates that forced migration is a struggle for legitimacy, memory, and history. (Hamdi, March 2023)

### **Methodology of Research**

The article has examined long-standing agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic world, including Pakistan, in order to identify the contributing elements. An analytical criterion of elements that serve as motivators for resolving disputes between Israel and the Islamic world will be produced by the analysis. Critical evaluation of the literature will serve as its foundation. We obtain our material from reputable newspapers and websites, including peer-reviewed papers, articles, and opinion pieces. The recent Abraham Accords between Israel and the four Arab nations of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria will be examined in the thesis after a number of books and research papers have examined the subject and produced a literature-based thesis. After that, the analytical standards will be expanded and improved to accommodate these new agreements, mainly in view of the balance of threat theory. The findings of the investigation will be used to make predictions about the future of Israel's relations with other Arab nations, including those with no contacts and those with semi-formal ties. Therefore, a more subdued strategy will be used. We will analyse the rather small body of literature around the Abraham Accords, attempting to identify motivators and arrange them according to the components of the Balance of Threat theory and other theories of international affairs. We will also include stories and opinion pieces from reputable publications and websites due to the paucity of peer-reviewed material, particularly on the Abraham Accords. An official statements and technical reports posted on governmental and semigovernmental organisations' websites, blogs, and social media accounts of the signing nations. We shall adopt a sophisticated approach by analysing forums and debates because it is highly likely that some of these publications would essentially regurgitate the central government's message.

### **The Push for Comprehensive Normalization: Unpacking the Call for Universal Israel-Arab Ties.**

As he urges nations in the area to ratify the Abraham Accords, the US president advocates for attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities. Citing the US attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities in June, US President Donald Trump has urged all Middle Eastern nations to establish diplomatic relations with

Israel despite the ongoing Israeli atrocities in Gaza. The growing worldwide movement to recognise a Palestinian state coincides with Trump's declaration on Thursday. (Jazeera, 1 Middle Eastern countries to have formal Israel ties, 7 Aug 2025)

Israel's relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have been normalised as part of the Abraham Accords. The Accords are significant in several ways. The Abraham Accords show that some Arab nations are beginning to separate the Palestine issue from their diplomatic ties with Israel. (Hamdi, March 2023)

### **The Game Theory of Middle East Alignment.**

Prior to the agreement, the three Abrahamic religions that dominated the Middle East had already begun to reconcile. Under the banner of "Year of Tolerance," the United Arab Emirates welcomed Pope Francis on his first-ever visit to the Arabian Peninsula at the beginning of 2019. The year concluded with the announcement of the construction of the Abrahamic Family House, a complex near Abu Dhabi that houses a church, synagogue, and mosque and is intended to foster harmony. In addition, the pope and the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar, the premier centre of Sunni Muslim scholarship in Cairo, signed the "Human Fraternity Document" in Abu Dhabi, continuing the UAE's attempts to maintain harmony with Christians.. (Thome, 2022) The agreements' reliance on the United States as a pillar, offering the Arab parties concrete advantages for formalising relations with Israel, is a flaw. In other words, the agreements pass via a third party who is on the providing end of the incentives rather than the receiving end. As a result, this endeavour is vulnerable to the whims of American democratic politics, such as fluctuating views of the country's public interests and shifts in power. In recent years, concerns about the United States' dependability have already emerged, particularly as the nation's intense party polarisation has permeated its foreign policy. (Yousef, NOVEMBER 2023)The confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, which has an impact on both the area and the entire world, is the U.S.'s new concern. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are strengthening their ties with Russia, China, and Israel because they recognise that the US is no longer a trustworthy partner in terms of regional security. As a result, they need to diversify and hedge their sources of protection. In addition to the gas and oil problems brought on by the war, these new over-the-table contacts with China and Russia may encourage the United States to engage in the conflict and become friendlier with the Gulf states. (Thome, 2022)

**UNDERBALANCING” AND THE NEW MIDDLE EAST COLD WAR:** Iran is the undoubted winner in regional-power terms in the past decade of Middle Eastern upheaval. For years, Iraq balanced against Iranian power in ways ranging from political competition to the massively destructive eight-year war in the 1980s. Today, Iran is the most influential player in Iraqi politics, having close relations with the Baghdad government, sponsoring if not controlling a number of Shi'i militias, maintaining a cooperative relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government, and indirectly fighting alongside the United States in the campaign against the Islamic State. Its client Hizballah remains the dominant force in Lebanese politics. (F. Gregory Gause, 2017)

### **Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A More Localized Struggle**

One of the most significant outcomes of the *Abraham Accords* has been the transformation of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict into a more localized Palestinian-Israeli struggle. The normalization of ties between Israel and several Arab countries, such as the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan,

has significantly reduced the collective leverage the Arab world previously held in pressuring Israel to address the Palestinian issue. As a result, the Palestinian cause has become increasingly marginalized within the broader Middle East, with fewer Arab states willing to condition diplomatic engagement with Israel on the resolution of the Palestinian issue. This shift has led to a more pragmatic approach in regional politics, signaling a move away from traditional pan-Arabism toward new diplomatic and economic interests. Despite continued rhetorical support for Palestinians, these shifts have also facilitated Israeli outreach to regional minorities and actors who were previously antagonistic, further isolating Palestinian leadership and limiting their influence over the broader Arab political sphere. (& Shimon Feuer, Nov 2020)

### **Conclusion**

The Middle East's geopolitical landscape underwent a significant and probably irreversible change with the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020. This analysis has shown that the accords reflect a strategic realignment motivated by a recalculation of national interests among important Arab governments, rather than merely diplomatic normalisation. The long-standing Arab consensus, which linked Israel's recognition to a settlement of the Palestinian conflict, has been severely shattered. The Accords indicate that the long-standing solidarity with the Palestinian struggle has been subordinated to immediate economic, technological, and security imperatives for signatories such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, primarily due to the common view of an Iranian danger.

In theory, a multi-framework approach is the most effective way to comprehend the Accords. The realism viewpoint emphasises the crucial "pull" of Israeli security and intelligence cooperation and the "push" of Iranian expansionism. From a liberal perspective, the "pull" of access to Israeli innovation and trade networks coincides with the "push" of unstable, oil-dependent economies. Constructivism goes on to explain this change as a step towards a new regional identity that puts modernity and pragmatism ahead of ideological unity. The long-running Arab-Israeli conflict was effectively transformed into a more localised Palestinian-Israeli battle with the Palestinians becoming more and more diplomatically isolated as a result of the convergence of these three factors: security, economic, and identity. But there is no assurance that this new status quo will last. The Accords are nevertheless susceptible to the unstable domestic political climate in the United States, which supplied the original incentives and mediation. Gulf signatories are already hedging their bets by building relationships with China and Russia as the U.S. attention shifts to other international arenas and its regional dependability is called into question. Moreover, the inability to reach a fair resolution for the Palestinians is still a festering wound that has the potential to undermine these agreements by igniting public unrest and giving non-state actors additional power.

The Abraham Accords' future course will depend on a number of factors, including the degree to which other powerful nations like Saudi Arabia join the framework, the agreements' capacity to provide real security and economic benefits to all parties, and how the international community handles the unresolved Palestinian issue. Although outdated paradigms have been successfully demolished by the Accords, a stable, all-encompassing peace has not yet been established. The final chapter on peace and coexistence in the Middle East has not yet been written, but the transition from a regional Arab-Israeli conflict to a manageable Palestinian-Israeli issue is complete. The Accords mark the start of a new, more complicated, and uncertain chapter in the region's history rather than its conclusion.

These agreements' sustainability is still up in the air, relying on how regional threats change and whether the unsolved Palestinian issue emerges to undermine these new alliances. In the end, the Accords have not yet brought about a complete peace, however they have opened a new, realistic chapter in regional relations.

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